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CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT TORT-FEASORS
IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
A definition of contribution which adequately encompasses the
various ramifications of the doctrine is difficult to arrive at; a definition general enough to prove workable is found in a Connecticut decision wherein it is defined as:
... the payment made by each, or by any, of several having
a common interest of liability of his share in the loss suffered,
or in the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf
of the others.'
In other words, it is:
*. . the right of one who has discharged a common liability
or burden, to recover of another
also liable the aliquot portion
2
which he ought to pay or bear.
In November of 1957 the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down a
decision 3 which undermined the very cornerstone of the foundation
upon which our traditional rule of contribution rested. The rationale
of this decision affords an excellent springboard into a survey-like
re-evaluation of the present Wisconsin position in the area of contribution. Before entering upon an analytical consideration of this decision, it would be advantageous to trace the historical development
of the law of contribution and thereafter to review the various Wisconsin decisions on which the decision in the style case could have
been founded.
II. ENGLISH HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since 1799, when Merryweather v. Nixon 4 was decided, it has been
an established principle of the common law that as between joint tortfeasors, there is no right of contribution. Prior to the case in question
one Starkey had brought an action on the case against the present
plaintiff and defendant for an injury done by them to his reversionary
estate in a mill; Starkey also included in his action a count in trover.
Starkey prevailed and levied for the entire judgment on the present
plaintiff, who thereupon brought an action against his co-defendant in
the Starkey case for "contribution of a moiety" based upon an implied
assumpsit. The plaintiff was non-suited and appealed. In the rather
meager report of the case, Chief Justice Lord Kenyon concluded that
no contribution could by law be claimed as between joint-wrongdoers,
and that this action upon an "implied assumpsit" could not be maintained on the mere ground that the plaintiff had alone paid the money
1 Fidelity

& Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 124
Conn. 227, 199 Atl. 93, 94, 119 A.L.R. 565 (1938).
2 Porten et al. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. et al., 204 Minn. 200, 283 N.W.
408, 412, 120 A.L.R. 962 (1938).
3 Rusch v. Korth, 2 Wis. 2d 321, 86 N.W. 2d 464 (1957).
4 8 Term. Rep. 186 (1799).
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which had been recovered against him and the other defendant.' The
underlying principle upon which this decision rested was unquestionably "in pari delicto potior est conditio."6 The harshness of this decision was somewhat tempered in 1827, when in distinguishing it, Chief
Justice Best pointed out:
... and from reason, justice, and sound policy, the rule that
wrong-doers cannot have redress or contribution against each
other is confined to cases where the person seeking redress must
be presumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful
act7
In 1936 the Merryweather rule was further modified so as to apply
only:
...

where both parties are actually employed in the commis-

sion of a tort. It does not apply in cases like the present, where
plaintiff was made a tort-feasor merely by inference of law,
being rendered liable for the act of his servant, although he
was not present and had no control over the servant at the
time."
Just before the turn of the century, the true attitude of England's
highest court toward their leading case on the doctrine of contribution
is mirrored in the statement of Lord Hirschell:
It is now too late to question that decision in this country;
but when I am asked to hold it to be part of the law of Scotland, I am bound to say that it does not appear to me to be
founded on any principle of justice or equity, or even public
policy which justifies its extension to the jurisprudence of other
countries.9
However, as late as 1934 in Hillen v. I.C.I. (Alkali) Ltd.10 the
court by way of obiter dicta, since the case dealt with indemnification
and not contribution, reiterated that there is no contribution between
joint tort-feasors, citing with approval the modification of the Adamson
case." Bound as the courts are by the rule of stare decisis, it took an
act of Parliament' 2 to allow contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors in England.
5 Cf. Everet v. Williams Ex 1725, 9 L. Q. REv. 197 (1893) wherein one highwayman brought suit against his associate for an account of their plunder.
The bill was dismissed because both parties were participes criminis; the
barrister who signed the bill was made to pay the costs, the solicitor was
fined 50k, and the plaintiff and defendant were both hanged.
6
7

Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it.
Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 13 Eng. C. L. Reps. 403, 405 (1827).

8 Pearson v. Skelton, 1 M. & W. 504 (1836).

9Palmer v. Wick and Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Company, Limited, (1894)
App. Case 318, 324.

20 1K.B. 455 (1934).
11 See supra note 7.
12

Law Reform Act (1935) 25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 30, §6(1) (3) which provides that a
tort-feasor may recover contribution from any other tort-feasor who is, or
would if sued, have been liable in respect to the same damages whether as a
joint tort-feasor or otherwise.
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ADOPT:ON AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRIBUTION IN WISCONSIN

The first reported case allowing contribution between negligent
tort-feasors in Wisconsin is Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. et al."3
Two parties sustained personal injuries when a train and a street car
collided in the city of Neenah. Suit was instituted against the defendant railroad company who in turn interpleaded the traction company, and cross-complained for contribution. The primary resolution
of the case at both the trial and appellate levels turned on whether the
plaintiff was in fact the real party in interest. However, the Supreme
Court, by way of obiter dicta, did make clear their position on the
contribution question lest it be raised by the defendants on a subsequent appeal. Justice Kerwin capably entered into a scholarly dissertation of the contemporary views on the doctrine of contribution.
After having reviewed the decisions supporting the English view and
the majority American view on the one hand and the minority American view on the other, he adopted the rule,
...
that where an element of moral turpitude is not involved
and there is no willful or conscious wrong between the parties
against whom a judgment in a tort action is recovered, there
may be contribution between the tort-f easors. 14
Thus, the general rule that there can be no contribution between joint
wrong-doers, was modified so as to grant relief when the wrongdoer's
conduct was non-intentional.
Justice Rosenberry, one year after the Ellis decision, pointed up
the principles underlying the right to contribution in the case of Frankfort General Ins. Co. v. Milw. Ry. & Light Co.,' 5 where, with complimentary approach, he quoted from 13 Corp. Jur. 821:
The doctrine of contribution rests on the principle that, when
parties stand in aequali jure, the law requires equality, which is
equity, and one of them shall not be obliged to bear a common
burden in case of the other. It is founded on principles of
equity and natural justice, and does not arise from contract.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
From these underlying principles it is apparent that there are three
requisite essential elements that have to be present before the equitable
relief of contribution is available; namely1. Parties in aequali jure,'6 having
2. A common obligation, with one party
3. Bearing on unequal proportion of the common burden 7
13 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
14 Id. 167 N.W. at 1053.
15 169 Wis. 533, 173 N.W. 307 (1919).
16 "In equal right."

"7Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Runquist, 209 Wis. 97, 244 N.W. 757 (1932)

Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Milwaukee General Const. Co., 213 Wis.
302, 251 N.W. 491 (1933); Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W. 2d
790, 35 N.W. 2d 911 (1948); Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6, 66 N.W. 2d 697 (1954).
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Although it is essential that all three of these elements be present before the right of contribution will obtain, it does not necessarily follow
that the court has treated them with equal emphasis. The stress has
varied according to the facts of the case. However, it would be of
particular benefit to consider these Wisconsin decisions in light of an
artificial categorization of them based upon the emphasis with which
the court treats each of the particular elements.
Paradoxical as it appears, for the parties to be in aequali jure, they
must be in equal wrong; that is to say they must be joint non-intentional or negligent wrong-doers. This principle may best be illustrated
by a negative example. In Fisher v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light
Co.,18 the plaintiff sustained injuries when she was allegedly thrown

from one of the defendant company's cars. It was the contention of
the company that the damages incurred by the plaintiff were partially
due to the negligent treatment afforded her by one Dr. Rumph; the
physician by order of the court was made a party defendant and the
company cross-complained against him for contribution. Dr. Rumph's
demurrer to the cross omplaint was sustained by the circuit court.
Justice Rosenberry, with typical lucidity, stated:
It appears that the liability of the defendant Rumph, if any
there be, is due to his want of care and skill as a surgeon, while
the liability against the light company is due, if any there be,
to its failure to exercise ordinary care. They are not in any
sense of the term joint tort-feasors. The liability of the defendant Rumph to the light company does not arise by reason
of his liability for contribution in the event of a recovery against
the light company. He is a liability over, and arises in favor
of the light company by reason of the fact that the light company is compelled to pay damages which are primarily due to
the alleged negligence of the defendant Rumph, and for which
the plaintiff might have maintained an action against the defendant Rumph. The light company being compelled to pay
these damages is subrogated to the plainti'ffs rights against
Rumph, as she may not twice recover compensation for the
same injury. 19
Since it is from the joint wrongful conduct that the common obligation springs it is difficult to find decisions that are illustrative of a
clear-cut distinction between these two elements. For example in
Grant v. Asmuth,2 0 Conrad and Loa Asmuth were injured when involved in a collision with an automobile operated by the defendant
Grant. Both brought suit against Grant but only Mrs. Asmuth recovered, her husband's action having been dismissed because of his
own contributory negligence. The defendant totally satisfied Mrs.
18 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269 (1920).
19 Id. at 270-271; also cf. Greene v. Waters, 260 Wis. 40, 49 N.W. 2d 919 (1951),
with Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W. 2d 455 (1958).
20 195 Wis. 458, 218 N.W. 834 (1928).
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Asmuth's judgment, and then by an independent suit sought reimbursement from her husband by way of contribution. Justice Eschweiler,
writing for a unanimous court, emphatically determined that Conrad
Asmuth although properly found guilty of contributory negligence had
not had his day in court upon the trial of the issue of his actionable
negligence with respect to his wife, nor had the issue of her contributory negligence with respect to him been resolved. The court held:
. . . until it has been properly determined by judgment to
that effect that Conrad Asmuth is also responsible to Loa Asmuth for her injuries arising out of this collision, the plaintiff,
Grant, cannot compel
contribution from Conrad Asmuth as a
21
joint tort-f easor.
A conscious awareness of this subtle blending between the first
two of the elements of contribution will be most advantageous upon
the subsequent analysis of the second element, namely, the requisite
of common obligation or liability. The digests are replete with decisions that place special emphasis on this element, but there is the
omnipresent articulate weaving into these decisions of the element of
joint wrong-doing. For example in Michel v. McKenna et al.,22 the
plaintiff was injured while riding as a guest in an automobile driven
by her husband; the injuries resulted from a collision with the cardriven by one McKenna. Prior to the institution of the personal injury suit, McKenna brought an action in civil court to recover the
value of his property damage. The jury by their finding absolved
him of any contributory negligence, and he recovered the total amount
of his claim. Mrs. Michel thereafter started a personal injury suit
against McKenna and her husband with McKenna cross-complaining
for contribution. Upon the trial the jury found only McKenna guilty
of causal negligence, awarded a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, with
the court dismissing McKenna's claim for contribution. The Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and held that the liberal
rule of pleading did not change fundamental law, stating:
• * * that there is no right of contribution in 2the
absence of
3
finding that both defendants are jointly liable.
Since both the verdict in the civil court as well as the one then before
the appellate court negatived joint liability, the right to contribution
was properly denied.
The efficacy of the requirement of common liability is most
graphically illustrated by those cases wherein contribution is denied
because of its absence. In the frequently cited case of Zutter v.
O'Connell,2 4 the plaintiff was injured in a two car collision while
21 Id. at 835; Cf. Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Pruntz, 263 Wis. 27, 56 N.W. 2d
516 (1953).
22 199 Wis. 608, 227 N.W. 396 (1929).
23 Id. at 399.
24200 Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930).
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riding as a passenger in a car owned and operated by his father. Suit
was brought by the son exclusively against the driver of the other
vehicle, who in turn interpleaded the plaintiff's father for the purpose
of obtaining contribution. The jury found both the plaintiff's father
and the defendant O'Connell guilty of causal negligence. The Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court dismissing the cross complaint for contribution. The decision was founded on the doctrine
of Wick v. Wick2 which precluded a child from recovering against
the parent. Since the plaintiff could not recover from his father there
was lacking the requisite common liability necessary to entitle the defendant O'Connell to contribution. After reaching this conclusion,
Justice Owens went on to illustrate a singularly characteristic difference between the element of common liability and that of joint wrongdoers.
Although the verdict established the fact that the accident
was the result of concurring neglience of both Thomas O'Connell and Phillip Zutter, the right of contribution does not spring
from concurring negligence. A common liability is the first
essential for contribution.
• . . In the absence of common liability there can be no
contribution. Although the negligence of Phillip Zutter concurred to produce the injuries suffered by Donald Zutter, his
son, it gave rise to no liability on the part of Phillip Zutter.
Thomas O'Connell, therefore, if and when he paid the judgment, discharged no part of Phillip Zutter's liability, which must
be a basis of a right to contribution from Phillip Zutter. 2
It is clear then that although the common liability flows almost universally from the concurring negligence of the joint wrongdoers, the
former is not inexorably united with the latter.
Assumption of risk is an area of law fertile with decisions in which
contribution is barred by the absence of common liability. A style case
27
in this area is Walker et al. v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. et al.
Walker and his two passengers brought suit to recover for personal
injuries sustained by them when the car operated by Walker crashed
into the rear end of the 'defendant's truck which had been parked on
the highway in the fog. The defendant company sought contribution
from Walker by way of a cross complaint. The jury found both the
defendant and Walker causally negligent and contribution was granted.
On appeal the court determined that Walker's guests assumed the risk
of his negligence as a matter of law, under the then existing weather
conditions. Justice Fritz wrote:
...even if the negligence on the part of Walker concurred
with the negligence of the defendants in causing injury to his
guests, Iselin and Bashaw, if the latter were not entitled as a
25

192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).

26 See supra note 24, at 76-77.
27214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721

(1934).
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matter of law, to recover from Walker, as their host for such
negligence on his part, then there exists no common liability
because of which
the defendants are entitled to contribution
28
from Walker.
Since the guests assumed the risk of Walker's negligence he was not
liable to them for their injuries, and therefore,
* . . there existed no such common
liability as was the first
2 9
essential for contribution.
Another instance where the joint negligence of two wrongdoers
may concur, and still not result in a common liability is under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. If for example, as in the case of
Britt v. Buggs et al.,'0 an employee is injured in the course of his
employment through the concurring negligence of his employer and a
third party, and he is compensated under the Workmen's Compensa,
tion Act, the third party is not entitled to contribution from the employer when the employee brings an action against such third party.
To enter into an exhaustive survey of the ramifications of contribution under the Workmen's Compensation Act is certainly not within
the purview of this article and would only serve to raise issues tangential to the central problem of contribution.
Still another instance where one is precluded from obtaining contribution though there be the concurring wrongful conduct of joint
tort-feasors is where one of the wrongdoers is guilty of gross negligence. The rationale underlying a denial of contribution in such a
31
case is pointed out in Ayala v. Farmers Mutual Auto Ins. Co.
The right of contribution in Wisconsin is based on principles of equity and arises from common liability . . . gross
negligence is so much more tortious than ordinary negligence
that equity does not require that one guilty of the former should
32
be afforded any right of contribution.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 725. Cf. Kauth v. Landsverk et al., 224 Wis. 554, 271 N.W. 841 (1937)
(Assumption of risk-inexperience of host-driver) ; School et al. v. Milwaukee
Automobile Ins. Co., 234 Wis. 332, 291 N.W. 311 (1940) (Assumption of risk
-skill and judgment of driver); Shrofe et al. v. Rural Mutual Cas. Ins.
Co. et al., 258 Wis. 128, 45 N.W. 2d 76 (1950) (Assumption of risk-weather
conditions); London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co.
263 Wis. 171, 56 N.W. 2d 777 (1953) (Assumption of risk-skill and judgment); Saxley et al. v. Cadigan et al., 266 Wis. 391, 63 N.W. 2d 820 (1954)
(Assumption of risk-skill and judgment) ; Purnir v. Mann et al., 249 Wis.
469, 25 N.W. 2d 83 (1946) (Assumption of risk-skill and judgment of
host) ; Sandley v. Pilsner, 269 Wis. 90, 68 N.W. 2d 808 (1955) (Assumption
of risk is affirmative defense and must be pleaded. Here not pleaded, and
therefore common liability existed) ; Forecki et al. v. Kohlberg et al., 237
Wis. 67, 295 N.W. 7 (1940) (No assumption of risk because no opportunity
to object).
30201 Wis. 533, 230 N.W. 621 (1930). (Employee injured while riding as a
passenger in a truck driven by his employer when the truck collided with
another car.)
31272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W. 2d 563 (1956).
32 Id. at 571 ; Cf. Wedel v. Klein, 229 Wis. 419, 282 N.W. 602 (1938) ; Twist v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 275 Wis. 174, 81 N.W. 2d 523 (1957) (Traveling
28
29
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In regressing for a moment it is apparent upon analysis that not only
is the element of common liability lacking, but, perhaps more importantly, that there is absent the element of joint negligent tortfeasors. The Wisconsin court has refused to extend the doctrine of
contribution beyond the realm of those cases dealing with joint negligent
conduct. Quite obviously, if the court was not disposed to include in
the purview of the doctrine a grossly negligent tort-feasor on the
ground that such negligence differs in kind from ordinary negligence,
then certainly the doctrine will not be extended to joint intentional
tort-feasors.
The third element requisite for a recovery under the doctrine of
contribution is that the party seeking it has born an unequal portion
of the common burden. It, however, is not necessary that there be
an actual payment of an unequal portion of the common burden before the right to contribution arises.
The right is an incident which follows the principal event;
that is, the concurring negligent act, and draws its life therefrom. When the concurring negligent acts give rise to the injured a cause of action against the joint tort-feasors, the incidental right of a joint tort-feasor to compel contribution is
created.3
Justice Fairchild went on by way of clarification to point out:
Once in being, although contingent, subordinate, or inchoate,
it has an existence in contemplation of law until it is no longer
needed as a recourse to which the joint tort-feasor may look
for relief from an unequitable burden placed upon him by reason
of the refusal of another to perform such other's duty by paying
obligation, unless sooner waived
his honest share of the common
3 4
or given up by its owner.

One bears an unequal burden of the common obligation if he is made
to pay more than his aliquot portion of such obligation. The case of
Homerding v. Pospychalla et al. 5 offers an excellent illustration not
only of the third element of contribution, but also of the effect of the
Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Statute36 on the overall doctrine
of contribution. There the plaintiff, Lucille Homerding, was injured
in a two car collision while riding in an automobile operated by her
husband. While negotiating a left turn, the Homerding car was struck
from the rear by an automobile operated by one Popsychalla. The
50-55 M.P.H. in a 25 M.P.H. zone, and colliding with the rear end of an
angle-parked police car is not gross negligence.)
33 De Brue et al. v. Frank et al., 213 Wis. 280, 251 N.W. 494, 496 (1933).
34Id. at 496.
35228 Wis. 606, 280 N.W. 409 (1938).
36 "Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering." Wis. STAT. §331.045 (1957).
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plaintiff brought suit against the driver of the striking vehicle, who
in turn impleaded the plaintiff's husband, and cross-complained for
contribution. Mr. Homerding then answered by denial, and counterclaimed for the damages sustained by him as the result of Pospychalla's negligence. The jury found both Pospychalla and Homerding
causally negligent, apportioning 90% of the negligence to the former,
and 10% to the latter. The trial court changed the verdict and absolved Homerding of all causal negligence. On appeal the verdict of
the jury was re-instated; the court went on to point out:
Upon those answers [special verdict] Pospychalla and his
insurer are entitled to judgment on their cross-complaint against
Theodore Homerding for thte recovery of contribution from
him for half of such amount as they pay to the plaintiff, in
satisfaction of his judgment. . .
After having resolved the contribution issue in favor of Pospychalla
thus entitling him to be reimbursed by Homerding for one-half of the
judgment in spite of the 90%-10% apportionment of negligence, the
court further determined that:
* * * his [Homerding] recovery upon his counterclaim must
be reduced to ninety per cent of his damages, as assessed by the
jury, and that recovery the appellants are entitled to have used
as an offset against his liability for contribution herein. 3
Shortly after the Homnerding Decision39 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Wedel v. Klein et al.4 0 was called upon to alleviate the apparent
harshness of the Homerding rule and to incorporate into the doctrine
of contribution the rule of comparative negligence. It was contended
that contribution between tort-feasors should be based upon a comparison of the degrees of their fault, expressed in percentages, rather
than on an aliquot apportionment. Thus, for example, in the Homerding case, if such were the rule, the damages would be apportioned between the defendants on a 90-10 basis rather than on a 50-50 basis.
The court acknowledged the contentions and discussions in support
of them as "very interesting," but found them:
* * * not sufficiently convincing to move us at this time to
reconsider and abolish
our rule with respect .
41
between tort-f easors.

.

. to contribution

V. EVALUATION OF RUSCH v. KORTH
After having considered the elements essential to a cause of action
in contribution, and the traditional rules of law which govern and give
life to these principles, it is appropriate to turn to the case which stimulated this study and evaluate it in light of these traditional rules. In
3 See supra note 35, at 411.
38Id.

3 See supra note 35.
40 229 Wis. 419, 282 N.W. 606 (1938).
41 Id. at 609.
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Rusch v. Korth,42 the plaintiff, Rusch, sustained injuries while riding
as a guest in the automobile of one Heimerl when it collided with a
car driven by the defendant, Mrs. Korth. The particulars of the collision are unreported. Plaintiff brought his action against Mrs. Korth
and her insurance carrier. The defendants answered by denial and
interpleaded Heimerl, along with his insurer, cross-complaining against
them for contribution. On the day of the trial and with the knowledge
of Heimerl, Mrs. Korth's insurer settled with the plaintiff for $1,109.00.
It had previously been stipulated between the respective defendant
insurance companies that the amount was a fair compensation for the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. At that point, Heimerl moved for
leave to amend his cross-complaint in order to aver that Korth was
estopped by reason of the settlement from denying her own negligence.
With tragic irony, the motion was denied, the contribution issue was
tried, and the jury absolved Korth of all causal negligence. The finding that Heimerl was 100% causally negligent totally negatived the
element of common liability and lended to the settlement the nature
of a mere gratuity. Korth was then confronted with the paradoxical
duty of requesting the trial court to change certain of the questions
of the special verdict so as to find him causally negligent, that there
might be a common liability between the joint tort-feasors. The trial
court denied Korth's motion and dismissed the cross-complaint for contribution. Justice Wingert who was called upon to write for the majority manifested at the inception of his opinion his acute awareness
of the traditional elements of contribution when he wrote:
It has been stated in many cases, as an accepted principle,
that the right to contribution rests on a common liability. On
the basis of that proposition it has been said on occasion that
only when both of those persons whose conduct contributed to
can the one have the
the accident have been found negligent
43
right of contribution against the other.
However, the majority was of the opinion that the quoted principles
were too broad to apply to the facts that had given rise to the question
then before the court. Shifting to a consideration of the equities of
the case because "contribution between joint tort-feasors is in origin
an equitable principle," the court determined that the equities weighed
heavily in favor of the innocent settler. The conscience of the court
dictated that:
If a wrongdoer who has paid a claim may recover half the
payment from another, who ought in fairness to pay part of it,
surely one who is found not to have been guilty of any wrong
42 2 Wis. 2d 321, 86 N.W. 2d 464 (1957).
43 Id. at 467.
4

Id.
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should not be denied a like recovery from
45 one who ought in
equity and fairness to pay the whole claim.
Thus the court for the first time since the adoption of the doctrine
of contribution granted the relief it affords despite the conspicuous
absence of common liability and joint wrong-doing. The court admittedly realized that its decision ran contra to certain of their prior
decisions, citing three 4 6 of them, and acknowledged that they were not
over-looked in reaching the style decision; the court stated that it was
unwilling to extend the rationale of these decisions "to the very different case now before us."147 The last of these cited opinions, Mutual

Automobile Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual,4" illustrates the extreme
to which the court extended itself in granting relief. This case made
patent the necessity for the one seeking relief by way of contribution
to prove his own causal negligence. There, one Delia Mantin, a
pedestrian, was injured in an accident involving automobiles driven by
the respective insureds of the insurance companies involved in the
suit. Mrs. Mantin had instituted suit against both companies, but
before trial, negotiated a settlement with the plaintiff company. Upon
the defendant company's refusal to contribute suit was brought. Both
drivers were found causally negligent, and contribution was granted.
The case was reversed on appeal because no consideration had been
given to the negligence of Mrs. Mantin. At the very outset a unanimous court made patent the necessity for the one seeking relief by
way of contribution to prove his own negligence when it wrote:
In bringing this action it was plaintiff's burden to show,
first, that its own driver was causally negligent and that such
negligence
was greater than any negligence of the injured
49
party.

The force of this requisite is bolstered by several decisions antecedent
to the one cited in the Rusch opinion. In Western Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Milwaukee General Construction Co. et al.50 it was stated with
unequivocal emphasis:
The burden is upon the paying tort-feasor to establish his
own negligence and the negligence of the other tort-feasor as
the concurring causes of the injuries.5
The same rule is enunciated with comparable emphasis in London
Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co.52
45 d. at 468.
46 Michel v. McKenna, 199 Wis. 608, 227 N.W. 396 (1929) (common liability);
Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co., Inc. et al., 254 Wis. 233, 35 N.W. 2d 920 (1949)
(settlement a gratuity) ; Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. of the Town of Herman
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6, 66 N.W. 2d 697 (1954)
(burden of proof).
47 See supra note 42, at 469.
48 268 Wis. 6, 66 N.W. 2d 697 (1954).
4Id. at 699.
50213 Wis. 302, 251 N.W. 491 (1933).
51 Id. at 493.
52263 Wis. 171, 56 N.W. 2d 777 (1953).
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Plaintiff had the rather unusual burden of establishing that
its assured was guilty of actionable causal negligence. Unless
both Miss Bloom, and McDermott were so found neither
5 3 can
recover from the other upon the theory of contribution.
The court admittedly did not over-look these decisions, but instead
disregarded them without in fact over-ruling them. The same approach
was adopted in dispensing with the requirement of common liability.
The court voluntarily restricted the scope of their consideration to the
unique facts then before it, and resolved the issue by relying on the
broadest of equitable principles.
The rationale on which the decision hinges is subject to alternative
criticism. Granted that contribution is founded upon principles of
equity and natural justice, as the court suggests citing Waite v. Pierce 4
it is nevertheless a common law right.5 If the court is to base each
contribution decision on equitable considerations pertinent to the facts
then before it, then certainly all pertinent and well-known equitable
maxims should be applied. If this be not so, the law of contribution
will unquestionably be reduced to utter chaos. 56 In Rusch v. Korth"7
the court seemed moved by its equitable conscience, to the aforementioned conclusion that:
If a wrongdoer who has paid a claim may recover half the
payment from another who ought in fairness to pay part of it,
surely one who is found not to have been guilty of any wrong
should not be denied a like recovery from one who ought in
equity and fairness to pay the whole claim. 58
Certainly the rule of "equity and fairness" as determined by the
conscience of the court is not the only rule to be applied. What of the
equitable maximEquity will not aid a volunteer.5 9
An alternative, or perhaps more accurately, an ancilliary criticism
of the court's approach to an otherwise satisfactory conclusion, is the
total disregard that was given to the facts of the alleged joint negligence. If the court was sympathetically inclined- toward the cause of
the appellants in light of their unique plight, why not make a comprehensive and detailed investigation into the facts that ultimately gave
rise to this dilemma? It is admitted in both briefs that the appellant
3Id. at 780.
o
54 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).

55 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59
N.W. 2d 425 (1953).
56 Cf. In re Koch's Estate, 148 Wis. 548, 134 N.W. 663, 666 (1912).
"The
individual chancellor cannot, as an original proposition, do in each case
what he may think will fit the facts from the standpoint of justice in the abstract. He cannot merely seize upon his ideal in the moral sense and vitalize
it by a decree. That would make contribution depond on arbitration in the
habiliments of judicial administration."
57 See supra note 42.
58 Id. at 468.
59 30 C.J.S. (1959 Supp.), §89.
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Korth was on the wrong side of the center line when the impact occurred; the only controversy relative to this fact is whether such act
of negligence was causal. In spite of the fact that Wis. Stats.
§85.15(1)(4)60

necessitates the conclusion that such conduct con-

stitutes negligence as a matter of law, the jury found that Mrs. Korth
was not negligent with respect to her position on the highway, and
further resolved unnecessarily, that her position on the highway did
not causally effect the collision. Such a finding was unquestionably
contrary to the evidence as Justice Broadfoot suggested in his very
succinct concurring opinion.
In my opinion the record requires a finding that Mrs. Korth
was negligent as6 1 a matter of law, and that her insurer is entitled

to contribution.

In terms suggesting sound judicial caution he went on:
The majority has determined the case upon an issue not
raised in the briefs nor argued before us. Before we change
what has been the accepted rule in contribution cases I feel that
we should determine the question after research
and argument
2
by attorneys in this or some other case.
Thus the way was open and patent for the court to reach the desired
result without over-turning with one sweep, those principles which
have been corner-stones of the doctrine of contribution in Wisconsin
since its inception.

VI.

v. KORTH
The impact that this decision will have on the future law of contribution is a question fertile with material for speculation. Perhaps
as the concurring opinion suggests it changes the accepted rule of common liability in contribution cases. Perhaps, in view of the majority's
refusal to over-rule in "ipsis verbis" those decisions that are cited
and ignored, the old rule has not been modified and the Rusch decision
is going to stand as an anomaly in the law of contribution. Perhaps,
the decision will be rigidly restricted in interpretation to its precise and
singular facts. Speculation may and undoubtedly has run far afield,
but the real efficacy of the decision will not be determined until the
court is ultimately called upon to resolve an appeal in keeping with
Rusch Ov.
Korth.63
JAMEs G. DOYLE
EFFICACY OF RuSCH

ro Section changed in 1957 to §346.05 (1) (3), and §346.13 (2) respectively.
61 See supra note 42, at 469.

2 Id.
2 Wis. 2d 321, 86 N.W.2d 464 (1957). [Since the formal preparation of this ar-

63

ticle, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has delivered its opinion in the case of Bauman v. Gilbertson, 7 Wis. 2d 467, 470 (1959), in which the Court said of the
Rusch decision: "The latter case in reality should not be classed as a contribution case but rather as one grounded on the principles of subrogation. KennedyIngalls Corp. v. Meissner (1958), 5 Wis. 2d 100, 106, 92 N.W. 2d 247." Ed.]

